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Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth: 
A Test for Granger Causality
Illoong Kwon*
Abstract: This paper tests the existence and the direction of causality between
fiscal decentralization and economic growth. The previous literature has implicitly
assumed that decentralization causes economic growth, and has largely ignored
the possibility that economic growth can cause fiscal decentralization as well.
This paper applies the Granger-causality test to panel data from 21 countries
between 1975 and 1995, and finds that fiscal decentralization does not cause
economic growth, but that economic growth causes fiscal decentralization.
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INTRODUCTION
With the New Public Management, there has been a growing trend for decentral-
ization in both developed and developing countries (Iimi, 2005). In particular, fiscal
decentralization, the delegation of fiscal power from the national government to subna-
tional governments, is viewed as part of a reform package to enhance the performance
of public sectors (Davoodi & Zou, 1998). Consequently, recent studies have focused
on measuring the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth. So far, how-
ever, the empirical evidence is mixed and ambiguous (see for example Oates, 2002;
Asatryan, 2010).
This paper examines the existence and the direction of causality between fiscal
decentralization and economic growth using the Granger-causality test. Based on
panel data from 21 countries between 1975 and 1995, the homogenous Granger-
causality tests suggest that fiscal decentralization does not cause economic growth.
Instead, the tests suggest that economic growth causes fiscal decentralization.
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These findings contradict the implicit or explicit assumption of earlier studies that
fiscal decentralization causes economic growth, and provide a potential explanation
for the mixed empirical evidence in those studies.
One argument for the causality from fiscal decentralization to economic growth is
the “decentralization theorem” by Oates (1972). When differences exist in demand
schedules and cost functions for public goods across jurisdictions, if the national govern-
ment cannot distinguish this difference, fiscal centralization can imply a uniform level
of public goods consumption across all jurisdictions. With fiscal decentralization,
however, the local governments can reflect the heterogeneity across jurisdictions and
adjust the level of public goods consumption accordingly, which should improve effi-
ciency and lead to higher economic growth.
Another argument is that fiscal decentralization would induce vertical (national vs.
subnational governments) and horizontal (among subnational governments) competi-
tion (Tiebout, 1956; Weingast, 1995). Then, competing governments would have an
additional incentive to improve efficiency and social welfare, which should lead to
faster economic growth.
However, it is also possible that economic growth causes fiscal decentralization.
For example, national-government-driven economic growth may lead to faster economic
growth initially but greater inequality among jurisdictions (Williamson, 1965). Then,
after economic growth reaches a certain level, such a country may have to decentralize
fiscal power to improve regional equality and social stability. In this case, economic
growth causes fiscal decentralization, not the other way around.
Likewise, after economic growth reaches a certain level, consumers in different
jurisdictions may look for more diverse goods and services beyond homogenous
necessities. Then, fiscal decentralization to empower local governments to reflect such
regional heterogeneity would be efficient.
Therefore, causality can run in either direction between decentralization and economic
growth. In particular, from a simple correlation between decentralization and economic
growth, one cannot conclude that decentralization causes economic growth.
It is, however, generally difficult to test the causality between two variables, and
there exists no definitive statistical test for the direction of causality. With this caveat,
the Granger-causality test has been most popular. As discussed in the Empirical
Methodology section below, the Granger-causality test relies on an intuitive idea that if
X can help in predicting Y, but Y cannot help predicting X, X must cause Y.
While the original Granger-causality test was developed for time series data, the
Granger-causality test for panel data has been developed recently. In this paper, I apply
the homogenous Granger-causality test for panel data by Hurlin and Venet (2001) and
Hurlin (2004).
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Following the previous literature, I use the ratio of subnational government spending
to total government spending reported in the International Monetary Fund’s Government
Finance Statistics1 as a measure of fiscal decentralization (see for example Davoodi &
Zou, 1998; Thiessen, 2003; Yilmaz, 2000; Iimi, 2005). I also measure economic
growth by the growth rate of real GDP per capita as reported by the World Bank.
With these measures, the homogenous Granger-causality tests suggest that fiscal
decentralization does not cause economic growth. This result is robust to various other
measures and specifications. Interestingly, however, the test also shows that economic
growth causes fiscal decentralization.
These results are significant in several ways. First, they show that implicit or explicit
assumptions in the previous literature that fiscal decentralization causes economic
growth may be incorrect. Second, if fiscal decentralization does cause economic
growth, the current measure for fiscal decentralization (that is, the Government
Finance Statistics expenditure decentralization measure) may not reflect fiscal decen-
tralization correctly. Third, if economic growth causes fiscal decentralization, the
typical empirical specification in the previous literature, in which economic growth is
an independent variable, would suffer from the reversed causality bias.
It is worth re-emphasizing that there exists no definitive statistical test for causality.
Thus, the Granger-causality tests must be interpreted with great caution, and the evi-
dence presented in this paper is suggestive at best, not conclusive. Despite these
caveats, as far as I know, this paper is the first to formally test the causality between
fiscal decentralization and economic growth, and the first to show that economic
growth may cause fiscal decentralization and not the other way around.
RELATED LITERATURE
Theoretically, fiscal decentralization delegates decision rights to local governments
that have better information about demands and costs for the provision of public goods
in local jurisdictions. Therefore, Oates’ decentralization theorem states:
In the absence of cost-savings from the centralized provision of a good and
inter-jurisdictional externalities, the level of welfare will always be at least as
high (and typically higher) if Pareto-efficient levels of consumption are provided
in each jurisdiction than if any single, uniform level of consumption is maintained
across all jurisdictions (Oates, 1972).
Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth 163
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
1. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfs/manual/aboutgfs.htm.
Then, fiscal decentralization should improve the efficiency of the public sector and
lead to faster economic growth.
Also, if labor and capital are very mobile and choose the best location to operate,
fiscal decentralization can lead to competition among local governments for more effi-
cient provision of public goods (Tiebout, 1956; Weingast, 1995). Then, fiscal decen-
tralization should lead to faster economic growth as well.
Empirically, however, the evidence has been mixed and ambiguous. Davoodi and
Zou (1998), for example, use panel data from 46 countries between 1979 and 1989,
and find that fiscal decentralization has a weakly negative effect on economic growth
in developing countries and no significant effect in developed countries. Iimi (2005), on
the other hand, uses more recent panel data from 51 countries between 1997 and 2001,
and finds that fiscal decentralization has a significantly positive effect on economic
growth. Woller and Phillips (1998) use panel data from 23 countries between 1974 and
1991, and find no significant relationship.
In response to this mixed evidence, Thornton (2007) and Stegarescu (2005)
attempt to improve the measure of fiscal decentralization. However, Thorton (2007)
and Baskaran and Feld (2009) find no significant relationship in OCED countries,
even with the better measure for fiscal decentralization. Also, Iimi (2005) attempts to
control for possible omitted variable bias using instrument variable estimation, and
finds positive effects. Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2003), however, show that the
positive effect holds for developing countries only. Moreover, Iimi (2005) uses only
four years of data, and cannot measure the long-term effect of fiscal decentralization.
It is interesting to note that all these empirical studies have implicitly assumed that
fiscal decentralization causes economic growth, and have not considered the possibility
of the reversed causality. As discussed in the beginning, economic growth can also
cause fiscal decentralization.
Williamson (1965) and Green (1969), for example, show that in the early period of
economic development, regional inequality arises both within countries and across
countries, but eventually reaches a peak and declines thereafter during the advanced
stage of growth. One explanation is that if regional inequality reaches a peak, it will
exacerbate the inefficiency of fiscal centralization (Oates, 1972) and lead to social
unrest. Therefore, the government may have to respond with fiscal decentralization to
reduce regional inequality. Note that in this explanation early economic growth and
growing regional inequality cause fiscal decentralization.
To my best knowledge, however, there has been no formal empirical analysis to
test the existence and the direction of causality between fiscal decentralization and
economic growth.
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EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
To test the existence and the direction of causality between fiscal decentralization
and economic growth, I apply the Granger-causality test for panel data. The original
Granger-causality test (Granger, 1969) was developed for time series data and has
been widely used as a standard econometric tool.2
The idea of Granger causality is simple. “A variable X Granger-causes Y if Y can
be better predicted using the histories of both X and Y than it can using the history of
Y alone.” More specifically, to test a null hypothesis that X does not Granger-cause Y,
one can estimate the following model:




k=1γkXt-k + εt (1)
Then one can simply use an F-test to examine the null hypothesis that γ1 = … γK = 0.
More recently, the Granger-causality test for panel data has been developed. In this
paper, I use a simple adaptation of the Granger-causality panel data approach with
fixed coefficients, proposed by Hurlin and Venet (2001) and Hurlin (2004).
Let us denote the level of fiscal decentralization and the growth rate of GDP per
capita in country i at time t by FDit and Growthit. To test whether fiscal decentraliza-
tion causes economic growth, I estimate the following equation:




k=1γkFDt-k + δi + εit (2)
where δi is the country fixed effect. In an F-test, if the null hypothesis that γ1 = … γK =
0 is rejected, it would suggest that fiscal decentralization Granger-causes economic
growth.
The choice of lags J and K is important. Insufficient lags can yield autocorrelated
errors, while too many lags reduce the power of the test. Thus, I will check the robust-
ness of the results with a varying number of lags.
Likewise, to test whether economic growth causes fiscal decentralization, with
slight abuse of notations, I estimate the following equation:




k=1γkGrowtht-k + δi + εit (3)
Again, in an F-test, if the null hypothesis that γ1 = … γK = 0 is rejected, it would
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2. For this contribution among others, Clive Granger won the Nobel Prize in Economics in
2003.
suggest that economic growth Granger-causes fiscal decentralization.
It is also possible to have bidirectional causality. That is, fiscal decentralization may
cause economic growth, and economic growth may also cause fiscal decentralization.
Conceptually, the idea of Granger causality has several components. First, it
assumes temporality—only past values of X can cause Y. Second, it assumes exogeneity.
As Sims (1972) has pointed out, a necessary condition for X to be exogenous of Y is
that X fails to Granger-cause Y. Similarly, the idea of Granger causality implies inde-
pendence in that variables X and Y are only independent if each fails to Granger-cause
the other.
As emphasized in the beginning, however, Granger causality is not a definitive
test for causality. In particular, if there exists a third variable with different lags that
affect both X and Y, one can erroneously conclude Granger causality. Also, in equa-
tions (2) and (3), it is assumed that the coefficients are the same for all countries; this
is called the homogenous Granger-causality test. Therefore, even when we reject the
homogenous Granger causality in panel data, it is still possible to have causality in
some individual countries. Therefore, the results from the Granger-causality test must
be interpreted as suggestive rather than conclusive evidence.
Finally, for Granger-causality testing, it is important that each variable is stationary.
If both variables are nonstationary, they can have spurious correlation (Granger &
Newbold, 1974; Philips, 1986). Therefore, I will employ the Levin, Lin, and Chu
(2002) and Harris and Tzavalis (1999) panel unit root tests before proceeding to
Granger-causality tests.
DATA
Following the previous studies, I use the ratio of subnational government expendi-
ture to total government expenditure as a proxy for fiscal decentralization. The primary
data source for this measure is the International Monetary Fund’s Government Finance
Statistics. To measure economic growth, I use the annual growth rate of real GDP per
capita from the World Bank.
To measure the long-term effects, it is important to have long enough time series.
Also, for the panel unit root tests (discussed in more detail in the Empirical Results
section below), I need a balanced panel. Since the Government Finance Statistics fiscal
decentralization measure is missing for many countries, I end up with 21 countries
yielding 441 observations between 1975 and 1995. Table 1 shows the list of countries
and their average fiscal decentralization and GDP growth rates.
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Figure 1 shows a plot of these average measures. There is significant heterogeneity
in both fiscal decentralization and economic growth rates across countries. For example,
the United States has 43.88 percent fiscal decentralization and a 1.96 percent average
growth rate. Indonesia has 11.89 percent fiscal decentralization and a 5.09 percent
average growth rate. Therefore, it is important to control for heterogeneity across
countries in the empirical analysis.
The simple correlation between average fiscal decentralization and average growth
rate is -0.36. This does not support the hypothesis that fiscal decentralization leads to
faster economic growth. It is also consistent with some of the previous studies that
have found a negative effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth (see for
example Davoodi & Zou, 1998; Baskaran & Feld, 2009; Rodriguez-Pose & Ezcurra,
2010).
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Table 1. Summary Statistics by Country




















United Kingdom 25.27 1.94
United States 43.88 1.96 
Figure 2 shows the time trends of the cross-country average fiscal decentralization
and economic growth rates. Since there exist large fluctuations of economic growth
rates, for easier disposition, I use the three-year moving averages of the economic
growth rates in figure 2.
It is interesting to note that the decline of economic growth around 1982 is fol-
lowed by the decline of fiscal decentralization around 1986. Also, the rise of economic
growth around 1989 is followed by the rise of fiscal decentralization around 1992.
Even though these figures offer hardly any evidence for causality, they suggest that the
causation may run from economic growth to fiscal decentralization.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
As discussed above, the Granger-causality tests require the variables to be station-
ary. To test whether the fiscal decentralization and economic growth measures are
stationary, I use the Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) panel unit root test (denoted by LLC)
and the Harris and Tzavalis (1999) panel unit root test (denoted by HT). The LLC
test is recommended for panel data with 10 to 250 cross-section units and 25 to 250
time series. Since our panel data have only 21 years of time series, I also apply the
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Figure 1. Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth: Cross-Country Variation
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Figure 2. Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth: Time Variation
Note: Economic growth rates are given as three-year moving averages.
HT test, which is more robust for shorter panel data.
The null hypothesis in these tests is that the variables are nonstationary. Therefore,
rejecting the null hypothesis in these tests would imply that the variables are stationary.
Note that both tests require the panel data to be balanced, as they are in our data.
Because the annual growth rates of real GDP per capita have large fluctuations
with the business cycle, following the previous studies, I use the three-year averages
of the economic growth rate and fiscal decentralization measures. This process
reduces the number of time series from 21 to 7. In the next section, I will test the
robustness of the results when annual data are used.
Table 2 shows that the LLC panel unit root test rejects the null hypothesis for
both economic growth and fiscal decentralization, and suggests that both variables are
stationary. However, the HT panel unit root test rejects the null hypothesis only for
economic growth, not for fiscal decentralization. Therefore, it is possible that the level
of fiscal decentralization is not stationary. Alternatively, as shown in table 2, a test for
the growth rate of fiscal decentralization shows that it is stationary in both tests.
In the next section, I will check the robustness of the results when the growth rates
of fiscal decentralization are used instead of the level of fiscal decentralization.
To test whether fiscal decentralization Granger-causes economic growth, I estimate
equation (2) with two or three lags.3 In table 3, columns [1] and [2] show that con-
trolling for the lags of economic growth, fiscal decentralization does not help predict
economic growth. In particular, the F-test for the joint significance of the lags of fiscal
decentralization shows no statistical significance. Therefore, contrary to the implicit
assumption in earlier studies, fiscal decentralization does not seem to cause economic
growth.
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3. The Hausman test rejects the random effect model. Thus, I control for the country fixed
effects.
Table 2. Panel Unit Root Tests
LLC HT
Economic growth -54.5525 -9.4946(0.0000) (0.0000)
Fiscal decentralization -21.7043 0.9529(0.0000) (0.8297)
Growth rate of fiscal decentralization -8.2073 -11.634(0.0000) (0.0000)
Note: The table shows the adjusted t-statistics for the Levin, Lin, and Chu panel unit test (LLC), and the z-statistics for the Harris and
Tzavalis test (HT). P-values are in parentheses.
To test whether economic growth Granger-causes fiscal decentralization, I estimate
equation (3) with two or three lags as well. In table 3, columns [3] and [4] show that
controlling for the lags of fiscal decentralization, economic growth can help predict
fiscal decentralization. Formally, the F-test for the joint significance of the lags of eco-
nomic growth shows statistical significance at the 5 percent or 1 percent level depend-
ing on the number of the lags. These results suggest that economic growth Granger-
causes fiscal decentralization, but not vice versa.
ROBUSTNESS OF RESULTS
Recall that the panel unit root tests suggest that the level of fiscal decentralization
may not be stationary, but the growth rate of fiscal decentralization is. Therefore, to
test the robustness of the results, I re-estimate the models using the growth rate of fis-
cal decentralization instead of the level of fiscal decentralization (table 4).
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Table 3. Granger-Causality Tests
Dependent variable
Economic growth Fiscal decentralization
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Economic growth (-1) -0.1847* -0.3476** 0.2649** 0.3156**(0.1039) (0.1373) (0.1092) (0.1249)
Economic growth (-2) -0.2537** -0.3813*** -0.0776 -0.1660(0.1201) (0.1425) (0.1263) (0.1297)
Economic growth (-3) -0.3342* -0.2293(0.1769) (0.1609)
Fiscal decentralization (-1) -0.0131 -0.0710 0.7305*** 0.8352***(0.1018) (0.1324) (0.1070) (0.1204)
Fiscal decentralization (-2) -0.0863 0.1248 -0.3245*** -0.3440**(0.0995) (0.1441) (0.1046) (0.1311)
Fiscal decentralization (-3) -0.1218 0.1903(0.1261) (0.1147)
Observations 105 84 105 84
R-squared 0.0996 0.1751 0.4343 0.5381
F test for causality (p-value) 0.4822 0.7704 0.0322 0.0016
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1
Note: In columns [1] and [2], the F-test is for the null hypothesis that the lags of fiscal decentralization are jointly insignificant. In columns
[3] and [4], the F-test is for the null hypothesis that the lags of economic growth are jointly insignificant.
Table 4 shows that using the growth rate of fiscal decentralization does not change
the qualitative results. Columns [1] and [2] of table 4 show that the lags of the growth
rates of fiscal decentralization do not help predict economic growth rates. However,
columns [3] and [4] show that the lags of the economic growth rates do help predict
the growth rate of fiscal decentralization. Therefore, even when I measure fiscal
decentralization based on its growth rate, fiscal decentralization does not seem to
Granger-cause economic growth. Instead, economic growth Granger-causes fiscal
decentralization.
So far, I have used the three-year averages of economic growth rate and fiscal
decentralization. Even though using the three-year averages smoothes out the exces-
sive fluctuations of economic growth rates, it greatly reduces the number of time
series in our panel data. As Hurlin (2004) shows, if the number of time series is not
large enough, the Granger-causality tests may not be valid. Therefore, as shown in
table 5, I repeat the analysis using the annual observations of economic growth rates
and fiscal decentralization.
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Table 4. Growth Rate of Fiscal Decentralization
Dependent variable
Economic growth Growth rate of fiscal decentralization (GFD)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Economic growth (-1) -0.1967* -0.3517** 0.0043 0.0056(0.1034) (0.1369) (0.0033) (0.0034)
Economic growth (-2) -0.2881** -0.4000*** -0.0061 -0.0087**(0.1185) (0.1378) (0.0037) (0.0034)
Economic growth (-3) -0.3301* -0.0056(0.1764) (0.0044)
GFD (-1) 3.7947 2.7284 -0.3689*** -0.3775***(3.4710) (3.9228) (0.1097) (0.0970)
GFD (-2) 0.8204 1.0775 -0.1886 -0.2463**(3.8516) (4.8726) (0.1217) (0.1204)
GFD (-3) 5.1893 -0.0983(5.2630) (0.1301)
Observations 105 84 105 84
R-squared 0.0970 0.1785 0.1832 0.3559
F test for causality (p-value) 0.5408 0.7136 0.076 0.0025
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1
Note: In columns [1] and [2], the F-test is for the null hypothesis that the lags of fiscal decentralization growth rate are jointly insignifi-
cant. In columns [3] and [4], the F-test is for the null hypothesis that the lags of economic growth are jointly insignificant.
Table 5 shows that the panel unit root tests for the annual data yield the same quali-
tative results as in table 2. That is, the LLC panel unit root test suggests that both the
economic growth rate and the level of fiscal decentralization are stationary. However,
the HT panel unit root test suggests that the level of fiscal decentralization is not
stationary. On the other hand, both tests show that the growth rate of fiscal decentral-
ization is stationary.
Therefore, as shown in table 6, I test Granger causality between economic growth
and the growth rate of fiscal decentralization using the annual data.4 Because the data
are annual, to measure long-term effects, I use five- to seven-year lags.
In table 6, columns [1], [2], and [3] show that controlling for the lags of the eco-
nomic growth rate, the lags of the growth rates of fiscal decentralization have no sig-
nificant effect on the economic growth rate. That is, I cannot reject the null hypothesis
that fiscal decentralization does not Granger-cause economic growth.
Columns [4], [5], and [6] of table 6 show that controlling for the lags of the growth
rate of fiscal decentralization, the lags of the economic growth rate have significant
positive effects on the growth rate of fiscal decentralization. Therefore, economic
growth Granger-causes fiscal decentralization, not the other way around. Note that this
result is the same as the one from the previous section using the three-year averages.
Therefore, these qualitative results seem to be robust to various specifications and
measurements.
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4. The Granger-causality test between economic growth and the level of fiscal decentraliza-
tion shows qualitatively similar results and is not reported.
Table 5. Panel Unit Root Tests with Annual Data
LLC HT
Economic growth -7.2385 -19.6254(0.0000) (0.0000)
Fiscal decentralization -2.4862 0.2137(0.0065) (0.5846)
Growth rate of fiscal decentralization -7.0556 -25.5258(0.0000) (0.0000)
Note: The table shows the adjusted t-statistics for the Levin, Lin, and Chu panel unit test (LLC), and the z-statistics for the Harris and
Tzavalis test (HT). P-values are in parentheses.
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Table 6. Granger-Causality Tests with Annual Data
Dependent variable
Economic growth Growth rate of fiscal decentralization (GFD)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Economic growth (-1) 0.3517*** 0.3300*** 0.3337*** -0.0003 -0.0005 0.0010(0.0598) (0.0629) (0.0633) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0022)
Economic growth (-2) -0.1531** -0.1842*** -0.1488** 0.0023 0.0010 0.0009(0.0601) (0.0661) (0.0663) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0023)
Economic growth (-3) -0.0172 -0.0225 -0.0804 -0.0026 -0.0011 -0.0017(0.0613) (0.0637) (0.0678) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0024)
Economic growth (-4) -0.1454** -0.1550** -0.0898 0.0072*** 0.0067*** 0.0078***(0.0600) (0.0628) (0.0627) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0022)
Economic growth (-5) -0.0401 -0.0238 -0.0455 -0.0053** -0.0038 -0.0050**(0.0588) (0.0650) (0.0654) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0023)
Economic growth (-6) -0.046 -0.0328 -0.0036 -0.0035(0.0629) (0.0662) (0.0025) (0.0023)
Economic growth (-7) -0.1240* -0.0025(0.0637) (0.0022)
GFD (-1) 3.0784** 3.2475** 2.1401 0.1059* 0.0671 0.0704(1.3874) (1.4933) (1.5395) (0.0562) (0.0589) (0.0536)
GFD (-2) 0.3035 0.0870 -0.7005 -0.1693*** -0.1507*** -0.1391***(1.3463) (1.4279) (1.4790) (0.0545) (0.0563) (0.0515)
GFD (-3) -0.4173 -0.6563 -0.9312 -0.2040*** -0.2204*** -0.1932***(1.3163) (1.3971) (1.4230) (0.0533) (0.0551) (0.0495)
GFD (-4) 1.5828 1.1911 0.2655 0.0650 0.0277 0.0787(1.3281) (1.3746) (1.4356) (0.0538) (0.0542) (0.0500)
GFD (-5) 0.8186 1.1850 1.1796 -0.2452*** -0.2290*** -0.2294***(1.4682) (1.5122) (1.4963) (0.0595) (0.0596) (0.0521)
GFD (-6) -0.8171 -1.5204 -0.1025* -0.0938*(1.5505) (1.5350) (0.0611) (0.0534)
GFD (-7) -1.5693 0.1056*(1.6036) (0.0558)
Observations 315 294 273 315 294 273
R-squared 0.1816 0.1859 0.2097 0.1517 0.1683 0.2511
F-test (p-value) 0.2648 0.2691 0.4371 0.055 0.0398 0.001
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1
Note: In columns [1], [2], and [3], the F-test is for the null hypothesis that the lags of the fiscal decentralization growth rate are jointly
insignificant. In columns [4], [5], and [6], the F-test is for the null hypothesis that the lags of economic growth are jointly insignificant.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Theoretically, the previous literature has focused on the impacts of fiscal decentral-
ization on economic growth or the overall efficiency of public sectors. The classic
channels that make fiscal decentralization cause economic growth are information
asymmetry and heterogenous preference (Hayek, 1948; Oates, 1972) and interjurisdic-
tional competition (Tiebout, 1956; Weingast, 1995). Despite the growing trend of fiscal
decentralization, however, the empirical evidence for its impact on economic growth
is mixed and ambiguous.
This paper shows that the implicit assumption of the previous literature that fiscal
decentralization causes economic growth may be incorrect. The Granger-causality
tests for the panel data of 21 countries between 1975 and 1995 suggest that economic
growth causes fiscal decentralization but not vice versa.
These results may explain why the previous empirical evidence on the impact of
fiscal decentralization is ambiguous. More importantly, these results suggest that fiscal
decentralization is endogenous. Consequently, research on its impact must first analyze
what causes it.
I must re-emphasize that the Granger-causality test is not a definitive test for
causality, and that more studies are needed to confirm the direction of causality
between fiscal decentralization and economic growth. Thus, the main contribution of
this paper is in taking the first step in that direction.
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